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I. INTRODUCTION*
A PATENT IS NOT A HUNTING LICENSE'
As early as 1841, Justice Story, America's most sophisticated thinker
on private international law, directed his formidable power of analysis to
the nature of legal institutions and the juristic character of intellectual
property. According to Story, "Patents and copyrights approach, nearer
than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what
may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at
least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost
evanescent."2 Intellectual property claims and entitlements in the context
of global health care concerns may well be the burial ground of Justice
Story's evanescent property distinctions.3
** Although there is an internal discourse on this topic within South Africa, this Article is
only concerned with the international intellectual property implications of South Africa's AIDS
crisis.
1. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966).
2. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) ,(Story, Cir. J.).
3. Under the U.N. Charter system, general international law and international economic
order have traveled in parallel, but not always complementary, trajectories. Politics and economics
are specialized matters, and their scientific and intellectual universes are both distinct and discrete.
The U.N. Charter's major purposes are primarily matters of international peace and security.
However, the U.N. Charter also contains a hidden assumption that peace and security are important
bases for the achievement of other global world priorities, such as respect for the rule of law,
human rights, global economic equity, development, and progress. If the mandate of general
international law was unclear about the interdependence of peace, political economy, and human
rights, the key institutions of Western economic order sought to insulate players such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank from being contaminated byboth world politics
and general international law. In contrast, newly emancipated states were strident in defending their
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and sought to integrate a new economic global
agenda. Labeled the North-South Discourse and rooted in general international law, this novel
economic agenda was the center piece of a new world order framework.
The demise of the U.S.S.R. weakened the new model of international economic order as the
forces of globalism, emerging markets, and the political culture (which separates law and politics
from economic ordering) gained ascendance. The new battleground is the requirement that
globalism and its neo-liberal animating principles have a human face; a face that has a political and
juridical side to it. As the AIDS crisis affects development and human rights issues, this condition
has surfaced explicitly. Not only does this problem concern general international law and the world
order, it also impels us to re-examine global economic ordering in light of the U.N. Charter's
broader mandates, values, policies, and imperatives. A fortiori, it is true that there are strong
tendencies to insulate trade law in international law and intellectual property law, particularly from
the broader values of global, constitutional, and public order. In a modest way, this Article seeks
to bridge that gap. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the GlobalAIDS
[Vol. 14
20021 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECUAL PROPERTY, ACCEMs 7 HEALTHCARE. AND HUMAN RGH 157
When we consider that the economic consequences of globalization
amount to a process of political and economic ordering, a particular
statistic stands out. Over the past thirty years the disparity between the
richest and poorest parts of the planet has doubled.4 The poorest one-fifth
of the planet receives 1.4% of the global income; the richest one-fifth of
the planet receives 85% of the world's income.5 This widening gap
significantly exacerbates the problem of the practical realization of the
economic, social, and cultural rights which are part of the International
Bill of Rights6 and a vital component of the aspiration to universal dignity
in the promise of human rights for all. According to the Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997):
"It is now undisputed that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent,
interrelated and of equal importance for human dignity. Therefore, states
are as responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights as
they are for violations of civil and political rights."'
These economic, social, and cultural rights are thought to include
obligations that the state respect (no arbitrary deprivations), protect (secure
them as existent rights), and fulfill them in terms of reasonable -
attainable expectations.8 Health care and property interests are also a part
of the idea of socio-economic entitlements as human rights priorities.9
International intellectual property law, when serving as a complement to
these socio-economic norms, can facilitate the effective realization of
these rights. Once conceived in terms of special versus common interest
standards, and construed apart from the strictures of human rights law and
basic morality, intellectual property law may functionally serve only the
few, causing the detriment of the many.
The AIDS crisis of sub-Saharan Africa has served as the lightening rod
for a broader point of conflict between the haves of the developed societies
and the have-nots of the underdeveloped world. The AIDS crisis is a
health care crisis. According to the findings of the United Nations and the
Pandemic 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002); Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, andPower: State Creation
of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217 (2002).
4. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, § I(l),
Jan. 22-26, 1997, available at http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/instr/maastricht.asp [hereinafter
Maastricht Guidelines].
5. Id.
6. The International Bill of Rights consists of three international agreements: 1) Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; 2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and 3)
International Covenant on Economic, Social, andCultural Rights.
7. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 4, at § 1(4).
8. See id. at § 11(6).
9. See id. at § 11(7).
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
World Health Organization (WHO), twenty-eight million people currently
have AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, where it is the leading cause of death."
In 2001 alone, 3.4 million sub-Saharan Africans were infected with
HIV/AIDS, while an estimated 2.3 million died of AIDS in the same
region." These figures illustrate the world's gravest AIDS epidemic. 2
This high death rate is no mystery. Widespread personal and public
impoverishment or regional poverty make it virtually impossible for
individual patients to afford AIDS drugs and states do not have sufficient
public resources to provide drug therapy as a public health obligation.
South Africa, a country which has experienced an astonishing political and
juridical transformation, finds itself facing a health crisis as the AIDS
epidemic infects millions of its newly enfranchised citizens. As South
Africa considered its public health options, the United States watched the
evolution of South Africa's AIDS policy with growing apprehension
verging on outright hostility. Because Section 15(C) of the South Africa
Medicines Act 13 permitted the South African Minister of Health to take
measures to protect the public health, the U.S. congressional and executive
branches reacted by designating South Africa a Section 301 Priority Watch
State. 4 Actions by the United States and interested pharmaceutical
corporations implied that South Africa was in violation of international
intellectual property law. Two issues not specifically addressed were:
10. AIDS Epidemic Update- Dec. 2001, Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
and the World Health Organization, available at UNAIDS/01.74E-WHO/CDS/CSR/NCS/2001.2,
at 1 [hereinafter UNAIDS Update].
11. Id. at 14. This statistic is a gross estimate because many AIDS deaths in Africa are not
reported. Moreover, deaths caused by AIDS-related opportunistic diseases, such as malaria and
tuberculosis, are rarely reported as having been associated with AIDS.
12. Id.
13. S. Aft. Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965, Amendment No.
70, Section 15(C) (1997), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-
January/000607.html [hereinafter Section 15(C) of the S. Ar. Medicines Act]; see also infra text
accompanying note 34.
14. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.T.R. Announces Results of
Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999) (placing South Africa on the United States's Special
301 Watch List, because it was infringing on TRIPS). However, in December 1999, the U.S. Trade
Representative formally announced that it was removing South Africa from the Special 301 Watch
List after the countries had reached an understanding whereby South Africa reaffirmed its
obligations under TRIPS, and the United States agreed to help address South Africa's health issues.
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Protection of Intellectual Property and
Health Policy (Dec. 1, 1999).
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(1) Whether the United States would consider the South African legislation
permitting the Minister to authorize parallel imports" of certain
pharmaceutical drugs a violation of international law; and
(2) Whether the Minister's broad power to authorize either parallel imports
or compulsory licensing 6 of essential pharmaceutical drugs would be a
violation of international law. 7
These issues are not only important for the specific matter of
HIV/AIDS drugs. In a broader sense, they also question whether other
essential drugs, available in generic form or as a result of international
norms governing parallel imports and compulsory licensing practices,
might undermine the economic foundations of intellectual property law
itself. Even more importantly, these issues raise questions about the
relationship of intellectual property law to international human rights law,
and to international law in general. The problem, as it relates to South
Africa, has also implicated important domestic law issues (as current
litigation indicates),'8 such as the constitutional basis of administrative
15. The AIDS Law Project defines "parallel imports" as "importing a drug or product from
another country where it is sold cheaper than in the local market with the permission of the patent
holder." AIDS Law Project, We Can Use Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports: A South
African Case Study, available at http://www.hri.ca/partners/alp/tac/license.shtml (last visited Dec.
12, 2001) [hereinafter AIDS Law Project].
16. "Compulsory licensing refers to an order by a court or government body that allows any
person or the government to use a patent legally without permission from the patent holder in the
public interest." Id. Basically, compulsory licensing is used and warranted to broaden access to
intellectual property in order to advance legitimate public interests. However, because international
intellectual property rights are created in the public interest via state law, it is only logical that they
be limited by state law also adopted in the public interest. The Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property clearly holds that, "Each country of the Union shall have the right to take
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure
to work." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 5(2), 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. TRIPS provides for compulsory
licensing, but restricts its use. TRIPS, infra note 21,.art. 31. NAFTA also permits compulsory
licensing, although it appears to limit the state more than TRIPS. See North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1709, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
17. "Compulsory licensing and parallel imports are tools that must be considered by all
governments, generic manufacturers, and health activists to promote access to essential medicines."
AIDS Law Project, supra note 15.
18. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., No. 4183/98 (Transvaal
Provincial Div., filed Feb. 18, 1998) (whereby forty-two global pharmaceutical corporations
brought suit against South Africa in an attempt to prevent the country's granting of compulsory
licenses on their AIDS medications via Section 15(C)).
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justice, 9 the nature and scope of the property clause of the South African
Constitution ° and how far and to what extent that clause may be
conditioned by the right to health (a constitutional and human right), as
well as by general human rights standards. Therefore, the challenge that
AIDS in a developing society poses is extraordinarily rich in both
complexity and potential for clarifying the meaning and scope of the
relevant law in ways that reconcile contending interests, and yet elucidate
the common concern of the larger international community.
This Article examines the question of access to patented medicines in
international law. It analyzes the extent to which international agreements
may lawfully limit affordable versions of these medicines that may be
available through parallel imports or compulsory licensing procedures. It
considers the concept of intellectual property rights from a national and
international perspective to determine how these rights must be sensitive
to matters of national sovereignty when extraordinary, life-threatening
diseases afflict societies in catastrophic ways. This Article suggests that
viewing property (including intellectual property) as a human right
requires that its scope be delimited and understood in the context of other
human rights. In short, property and human rights should be understood as
complementary, rather than antagonistic ideas. This Article also reviews
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
19. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 11, § 33 (Just Administrative Action):
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable
and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative
action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effects to these rights, and must
a. provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
b. impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and
(2); and
c. promote an efficient administration.
20. Id. at ch. II, § 25. The property clause of South Africa's Constitution (market driven and
induced compensation; willing seller-willing buyer) has always been in the interests of the
historically advantaged, and necessarily disadvantaging the poor.
[Vol. 14
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(TRIPS)21 in light of the contemporary standards of construction and
interpretation applicable to agreements of international human rights law.
II. AIDS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER - THE RELEVANT CONTEXT
AIDS is a disease of pandemic proportions. There is, as yet, no cure for
it and the best that science can offer is that its symptoms will be
sufficiently suppressed in order for the patient to lead a relatively normal
life. AIDS medicines are expensive and their regiments are somewhat
complex. The most important population fact about AIDS is that it is a
catastrophic plague often analogized to the Black Death in Medieval
Europe. The disease is unevenly distributed worldwide and bears a strong
correlation to poverty and underdevelopment. For example, it is estimated
that close to 1.3 billion people on the planet live on less than one U.S.
dollar per day.22 On the other hand, the developed, prosperous, mainly
Western democracies, hold twenty percent of the Earth's population, and
nonetheless consume eighty percent of the world's resources.2 3 These
figures would probably be mirrored in the context of the consumption of
medical goods. Moreover, studies estimate that every three seconds a child
dies of diseases whose causes are rooted in endemic poverty.24
Approximately, thirteen million people die annually from infectious
diseases, many of which are effectually Third World diseases.25 Because
they are Third World diseases, they do not represent a lucrative market for
global pharmaceutical corporations to invest the necessary resources to
secure their control or elimination. Thus, for example, a recent report in
the Bangkok Post stated, "The production of drugs for diseases like
African sleeping sickness has been stopped because it is a major problem
for people in developing countries, who are not a major source of revenue
for pharmaceutical business."26
21. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 31, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter TRIPS].
22. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT ON INFECTIOUS DISEASES: REMOVING
OBSTACLES TO HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT, ch. 1, WHO/CDS/99.1 (1999) [hereinafter WHO]; see
also SELECT COMM. ON INT'L DEV., SEVENTH REPORT, 1999, Minutes of Evidence, Mar. 23, 1999,
at #338.
23. See Earth Summit +5, U.N. GAOR, Special Sess., at "Consumption," U.N. Doc.
DPI/SD/1910 (1997).
24. UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2000 (2000).
25. WHO, supra note 22.
26. The High Costs of Free Trade, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 12, 2000.
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Other notorious diseases have similarly fallen into the pharmaceutical
vacuum of inaction. For instance, malaria, elephantiasis, dengue fever, and
others, ravage Third World countries, but the unprofitability of producing
cures and vaccines has discouraged any appropriate, therapeutic, medical
actions. This of course, raises a complex question about the conceptual
justification of why the patent holders' exclusive right to property is
almost exclusively protected. It is because of the assumed policy that the
incentive of such protection will stimulate greater research and therapeutic
benefits for the public in the long run. However, when we come to the
issue of AIDS, the figures are absolutely alarming. Currently, forty million
people live with HIV, a disease that is proven to be highly infectious.27
When this fact is considered, the conceptual justification for the patent
holder's exclusive protection weakens and possibly breaks down because
the incentive to innovate while denying public access to the innovation has
no therapeutic benefit for the world community at large.
If the AIDS pandemic has taught us anything, it is that AIDS is no
respecter of territorial boundaries. It is, therefore, in the national interest
of every state to pursue all possible measures to arrest the spread of AIDS
through education and to help the victims of AIDS in leading relatively
normal lives. This not only makes medical and economic sense, but is also
the politically wise policy. Moreover, subsidiary infections like
tuberculosis are also highly contagious and carry the added risk of drug-
resistant strains that do not respect territorial boundaries as well.
Recent statistics indicate that sub-Saharan Africa accounts for twenty-
eight million of the earth's AIDS patients.2" Since the region represents
one of the poorest areas of the world, the impact of AIDS is catastrophic.
Although efforts are made at community-wide education,29 the fact is that
access to AIDS medications in the current economic structure is derisory.
In South Africa, within a short period, millions of citizens have been
infected with AIDS and estimates indicate that the loss of these human
resources will increase poverty, potentially causing the South African
economy to lose approximately twenty percent of its GDP within twenty
years.3a This does not take into account that under current pricing
mechanisms, affordable AIDS drugs are simply not available to those
South African citizens who need them.
27. UNAIDS Update, supra note 10, at 1.
28. Id at 2.
29. For example, in Uganda slogans like "Zero Grazing" and more focused forms of public
and civic education have helped bring some degree of control over the spread of AIDS.
30. See UNAIDS Update, supra note 10, at 7.
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The problem that AIDS presents for South Africa is paradigmatic of the
AIDS pandemic's impact on other underdeveloped or emerging market
economies globally. Within South Africa, twenty percent of the adult
population and twenty percent of pregnant woman have tested HIV-
positive, with the black population experiencing the brunt of this plague."
As a result, South Africa has the world's fastest growing HIV infection
rate.32 It is therefore important that we examine carefully how South Africa
has sought to respond to the AIDS crisis and whether its response is
consistent with its responsibilities, obligations, and rights under
international law.
The most important element of conflict in regards to South Africa's
bilateral relationship with the United States lies in the scope of patent
protection under general and specific international law; in particular, the
international obligations under relevant treaty law, especially TRIPS, as
well as the general obligations under international law. These are matters
of great controversy and the legal issues they encompass are complex with
the stakes being extraordinarily high.
III. SOUTH AFRICA RESPONDS TO THE AIDS CRISIS
There are essentially two ways in which states might respond to the
issue of access to AIDS drugs on an affordable basis. These strategies are
well known in patent law and are variously described as compulsory
licensing and parallel imports. Both schemes are technically permissible
under TRIPS and related international intellectual property instruments,
33
but neither are unqualified. Current South African legislation effectually
empowers its Minister of Health to use both parallel imports and
compulsory licensing to protect the public health. In 1997, South Africa
amended its basic statute regulating medicines, namely the South African
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965. The
amendment to this act, specifically Section 15(C), was viewed with alarm
by pharmaceutical multinationals. And in turn, these multinational special
interests brought pressure on the U.S. administration to provide a vigorous
and effective response to the threat that Section 15(C) posed. Because the
31. See South Africa: Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted
Infections - 2000 Update (revised), Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the
World Health Organization, at 3-4.
32. Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing and South African Health Policy:
Managing Confrontation with US. Firms and Politicians, 29 INT'L J. OF HEALTH SERVS. 1, n.4
(1999).
33. TRIPS, supra note 21, arts. 6, 28, 31; Paris Convention, supra note 16, arts. A.I, 2;
NAFTA, supra note 16, art. 1709.
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legal battle lines have thus been drawn around Section 15(C), that section
is reproduced in full as follows:
Section 15(C)
The minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more
affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the
health of the public, and in particular may -
1. notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Patents Act, 1978 (Act. No. 57 of 1978), determine that the
rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the
Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine
which has been put onto the market by the owner of the
medicine, or with his or her consent; prescribe the conditions on
which any medicine which is identical in composition, meets the
same quality standard and is intended to have the same
proprietary name as that of another medicine already registered
in the Republic, but which is imported by a person other than
the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and which originates from any site
of manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the
council in the prescribed manner, may be imported;
2. prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the
medicine referred to in paragraph (b).34
In December 1997, forty-two pharmaceutical corporations joined the
South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and filed a law
suit in the High Court of South Africa.35 Claiming that Section 15(C)
violated South African intellectual property law, the South African
Constitution, and TRIPS, the plaintiffs sought an interdict 6 to prevent the
Minister of Health from implementing Section 15(C). 3' Although the suit
was put on hold for a short period while the parties sought a settlement, it
ultimately resumed when the settlement attempt failed.3"
34. Section 15(C) of the S. Afr. Medicines Act, supra note 13.
35. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President of the Republic of S. Aft., No. 4183/98 (Transvaal
Provincial Div., filed Feb. 18, 1998).
36. An interdict is roughly equivalent to an injunction.
37. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n, No. 4183/98.
38. However, on April 19,2000, facing immense international pressure, the pharmaceutical
corporations dropped their lawsuit against South Africa. Drug Firms Drop TheirAttack on SA Law,
STAR (S. Aft.), Apr. 19, 2001, at 1; Andrew Pollack, Defensive Drug Industry: Fueling Clash over
Patents, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 2001, at A6; Ann Simmons & Bruce Japsen, Firms Clear Wayfor
Cheaper AIDS Drugs; S. Africa Patent Suit Dropped, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2001, at 4.
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To persuade South Africa to repeal the legislation, the U.S. government
responded vigorously, involving the U.S. executive branch, the U.S. Trade
Representative, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the U.S.
Congress. The U.S. response was equivalent to what in basketball is
known as a "full court press." To illustrate, the U.S. Trade Representative
stated in her report on this matter: "We call on the Government of South
Africa to bring its [intellectual property rights] regime into full compliance
with TRIPS before the January 1, 2000 deadline.., and clarify that the
powers granted in the Medicines Act are consistent with its international
obligations and will not be used to weaken or abrogate pharmaceutical
patent protection."39 The U.S. Trade Representative also indicated that in
its view, the act "appear[ed] to grant the Health Minister ill defined
authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorized parallel imports, and
potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights."'4
On June 25, 1999, Vice-President Al Gore appeared to take the sting
out of the U.S. trade policy regarding access to affordable, essential
medicines in impoverished nations. Addressing South Africa, the Vice-
President declared, "I support South Africa's efforts to enhance health care
for its people - including efforts to engage in compulsory licensing and
parallel importing of pharmaceuticals - so long as they were done in a
way consistent with international agreements."' But this concession must
be given a stricter level of scrutiny. The central point of the concession
was substantially related to the U.S. Trade Representative's constructions
of the relevant TRIPS provisions. Indeed, public interest groups charitably
considered U.S. interpretations as controversial. However, a closer reading
of the relevant international agreements clearly demonstrates that the
United States had gone beyond Justice Story's evanescent view of property
distinctions, which are difficult to discern in the patent context.
The first and most unambiguous point is that, on their face, parallel
imports are generally not prohibited by TRIPS.42 There are two relevant
articles: Articles 28 and 6. Article 28 holds that the patent owner has
exclusive rights to import a product into a country.43 But, inelegant as the
term "exclusive" is, it is subject to Article 6." That is to say, exclusivity
is conditioned on Article 6. And under Article 6, if a patent is sold and a
39. U.S.T.R. Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 14.
40. Id.
41. Letter from Al Gore, Vice-President, United States, to James E. Clyburn, Chairman,
Congressional Black Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives (June 25, 1999).
42. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 28.
43. Id. art. 28(1)(a).
44. Id.
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country deems the selling to be exhaustive of exclusivity (the first sale
principle), then the state's decision to resort to parallel imports is not
subject to sanctions under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement or the WTO's dispute resolution institutions.45 In short, parallel
imports are licit under TRIPS. Moreover, they are valid under domestic
U.S. patent law and are common practice in the European Union. Thus, if
the United States seeks to impose some form of bilateral sanctioning
against South Africa, it must make its case under general international law
and not under the lex specialis of international intellectual property law.
The other area of legal dispute relates to the issue of compulsory
licensing. From the perspective of the pharmaceutical corporations, a
state's ability, under both domestic and international law, to issue a
compulsory license for a patent to a third party is a major loophole in the
international protection of patent rights. Such compulsory licensing
conflicts with the notion of exclusivity covering patent holders' ostensible
property interests. 46 According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
Article 31 of TRIPS must be narrowly construed or it will effectively
undermine the international security of patent-holder interests.
Representing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Lois Boland stated
that the practice of compulsory licensing must be strictly limited to
situations of market failure, or when the state has officially declared a state
of emergency.47 In short, only these circumstances qualify as exceptional
and make a state's use of compulsory licensing lawful in international
law.48 Ms. Boland has also claimed that, under TRIPS (Article 31),
invoking the power of compulsory licensure requires an "authorization"
that "shall be considered on its individual merits." '49 This latter principle
is a more plausible argument in the context of South Africa's internal
regime, which requires that the exercise of administrative competence be
accompanied by supporting reasons. Having conceded this point, it is
unclear whether this standard is fully defined in practice under TRIPS, or
45. Id. art. 6.
46. Taking intellectual property in international law is usually done lawfully by fair use
exclusions and compulsory licenses. However, when used to place and expand restrictions on the
patent holder, such exceptions to the Western ideology of private property in international law
become points of trade tension and conflict. These mechanisms test the limits of a state's public
interests on the one hand, and the scope of private ownership rights in intellectual property on the
other.
47. U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off. Rep. Lois Boland, Presentation at an NGO meeting in
Geneva (Mar. 26, 1999).
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 31(a).
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whether it must be evaluated and appraised under general international law
standards.
Under Article 31, a state has the competence to issue licenses of patents
to third parties.5" In normal practice, the state will establish standards for
patent owners to obtain royalties. Clearly, South Africa and most states in
the health care context will routinely do this. In South Africa specifically,
the setting of reasonable royalties would find support in the new
constitution's property clause." Furthermore, Article 31 also provides
other safeguards to reasonably protect patent owners' interests.12 However,
WTO rules permit the sovereign a very broad measure of discretion in
issuing compulsory licenses. According to the WTO, Member states are
not constrained on the reasons with which they may grant a license without
the patent holder's authorization. In actuality, only the Member state's
choice of procedure is regulated.
Nevertheless, the position, as expressed by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, does not represent U.S. practice. Examples given by
critics of the U.S. position include the compulsory licensing provisions of
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 7608)" and compulsory licensing patents
concerning nuclear energy. 4 Also, European practice does not support this
position." Moreover, to effectively give its people access to HIV/AIDS
drugs, Brazil has also frequently employed the compulsory licensing
technique. 6 Perhaps it is a sufficient comment on the U.S. position that
President Clinton's Executive Order lets the United States off the hook on
a hypocritical and unpopular, not to say fanciful, construction of the lex
specialis of intellectual property in this matter." Even more importantly,
although President Bush sought a review of Clinton's executive order
50. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 3 1.
51. S. AFR. CONST. supra note 19, at ch. II, § 25.
52. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 31(b-j).
53. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 7608 (2001).
54. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2183 (2001).
55. EUR. PARL. STMT., Access to Medicinesfor AIDS Patients in the Third World, Mar. 15,
2001 (2001).
56. In 1998, Brazil began a national program to fight AIDS by using compulsory licensing
to make affordable, generic AIDS drugs. Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28,
2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 28. Consequently, today Brazil has managed to stabilize its AIDS
epidemic and cut its national AIDS death rate by fifty percent. Id. at 29. Although the United States
had launched a patent complaint against Brazil and its use of compulsory licensing in the WTO,
it ultimately dropped its suit and agreed to settle. Barbara Crossette, US. Drops Case Over AIDS
Drugs in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,2001, at A4; US. Backs Down from Lawsuit against Brazil
at WTO, 0 GLOBO (Brazil), June 26, 2001, at 1.
57. Exec. Order No. 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 305,201 (2000). The order was titled "Access to
HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies."
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under pressure from the pharmaceutical corporations, he too found that
retreating to a legally defensible posture (as was implicit in Clinton's
Executive Order) was in the national interest of the United States.
Apparently, the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office lost the bureaucratic battle at the bar of public opinion.
Were he still alive, M.K. Gandhi would doubtless find solace in the verity
of one of his pearls of wisdom, namely, that there is more than enough for
everybody's needs, but there simply is not enough for everybody's greed.
A. South African Action and Relevant International
Law Standards (General and Particular)
Section 15(C) of the South Africa Medicines Act has two
distinguishable parts. The first part gives the Minister plenary power to
prescribe conditions for the supply of affordable medicines.58 The purpose
of this authority is to protect the public health. The preamble clause
concludes with the wording "in particular,"59 although it is unclear whether
the term refers exclusively to this ministerial power or merely to illustrate
possible forms of exercising it. Following the text of Section 15(C), the
phrase "in particular" essentially designates a scheme of parallel imports.
Furthermore, in parts (a) and (b), Section 15(C) simply recites the
relatively conventional terms and understandings that make parallel import
exceptions to the exclusive character of patent rights.'
To the extent that Section 15(C) was the subject of litigation in the
Pretoria High Court, it appeared that the lawfulness of parallel imports
under that section is what was contested. However, the preamble passage
can be read so as to not exclude other forms of action by which legitimate
exceptions to patent rights might be made. This could include the other
widely acknowledged exception, namely, compulsory licensing. It should
be noted that compulsory licensing is a power already prescribed in current
South African legislation.6' Moreover, the international law arguments for
parallel import or compulsory licensing exceptions involve similar
indicators of reasonableness relating to the interpretation of the relevant
TRIPS provisions and general principles of international law. Although
these two concepts are markedly different, they essentially have a
comparable juridical consequence in that they may be construed as
exceptions to the general norm of protecting ownership in a patent.
58. Section 15(C) of the S. Aft. Medicines Act, supra note 13.
59. Id.
60. Id. at (b), (c).
61. S. Afr. Patents Act No. 57 of 1978, arts. 4, 56 (1978).
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One of the key restrictions on parallel imports is found in the process
of contract formation itself. It is a standard practice that the contract of
sale for the purchase of a patentable widget may come with a condition
that it not be transferred to another country. This limitation finds support
in a maxim of ancient Roman law: Nemo plus juris ad alium transfere
potest quam ipse haberet.62 Thus, the main constraint on parallel imports
is essentially a standard, contractual stipulation that what is put in State
A's stream of commerce is subject to the condition that it cannot be
exported to State B, where it will be sold at a lower price. The operative
assumption is that the patent holder, or his licensee, is actually selling the
product in State B for a higher price.
The critical legal question is whether the parallel imports provision of
Section 15(C) falls within the Article 28 framework of TRIPS, and
indirectly in Article 30 and Article 31 of the same treaty as well. Even
though Section 15(C) seems to be inelegantly drafted, on its face, it is
consistent with TRIPS. There are two grounds where" TRIPS clearly
permits a difference. First, Article 30 clearly permits an exception to the
regime for protecting the patent holder's rights.63 And second, Article 31
provides a narrow basis within which the exception might be used and also
permits a variance in the context of national emergencies, or in situations
of "extreme urgency."
Using terms such as, to "protect the health of the public, '65 Section
15(C) is broader than Article 31 of TRIPS. At the very least, this implies
that in national emergencies or situations of extreme urgency, the Minister
of Health would clearly be acting under the meaning of Article 31 in
exercising the right to protect the public health. By any standard, South
Africa's AIDS epidemic epitomizes a catastrophic public health crisis.
Therefore, Section 15(C), which authorizes the procedures of parallel
imports in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) would be in compliance with
TRIPS.66 However, this does not mean that the South African Parliament
may not revisit Section 15(C) later, and redraft it for a tighter fit into
TRIPS.
Of course, this is the narrow version of the exception, and the broader
question is whether the power to protect public health would go beyond
"the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
62. "No one can transfer-to another more authority than he himself has." DIG. 50.17.54
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46).
63. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 30.
64. Id. art. 31 (b).
65. Section 15(C) of the S. Afr. Medicines Act, supra note 13.
66. Id.
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urgency .... ,6 For instance, if South Africa faced a declared, serious
health crisis that did not reach the pandemic dimensions of the AIDS
epidemic, would Article 31 of TRIPS grant its Minister of Health the
power to protect the public health at the expense of the patent holder's
right to property? It seems, that the power of the Minister of Health does
indeed extend to the concept of a serious health crisis which would require
him to protect the public health. As a technical matter, in such a context
parallel imports would essentially have to abrogate the contractual rights
stipulated in the original contract of sale, bringing us to the possible value
of private international law principles.
This scenario suggests that the axioms of private international law,
which generally give preference to'the sanctity of contracts, would have
to be limited by recognized legal principles to ensure that the Minister of
Health acts reasonably and not arbitrarily. One of the main concepts drawn
by analogy from private international law is the understanding that public
policy (ordre publique) may trump the normal operation of a private
international law rule such as the lex validates, or the proper law of the
contract.68 In effect, given sufficient grounds based on the public policy
interest and in order to protect public health, the Minister of Health may
decline to honor the normal rule. If the Minister of Health invokes the
private international law exception based on public policy to block the
67. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 3 1(b). However, this question was partially answered during
the WTO's last meeting in Doha, Qatar. Expanding the rights of developing countries to grant
compulsory licenses for drugs needed to combat their AIDS epidemics, the WTO"recognize[d] the
gravity of the health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries," and
"affirm[ed] that the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' rights to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all." Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO
Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., IM 1, 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001). Specifically, the WTO
broadened the compulsory licensing conditions of TRIPS' Article 31, declaring that, "Each member
has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
emergency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme emergency. "Id. at 5(c) (emphasis added); see also Paul Blustein, Getting
WTO's Attention; Activists, Developing Nations Make Gains, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at EO1;
Joseph Kahn, Nations Back Freer Trade, Hoping to Aid Global Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2001, at A30; Frances Williams, Declaration on Patent Rules Cheers Developing Nations, FIN.
TiMES (London), Nov. 15, 2001, at 11 (reporting that the WTO clearly stated the rights of poor
countries "to override patents in the interests of public health").
68. This concept of law is commonly called the "public policy exception" or the "public
interest exception," and it may be defined as "the principle that a person should not be allowed to
do anything that would tend to injure the public at large." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1245 (7th
ed. 1999); see also Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466 (1936); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99
(1918).
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assertion of contract rights, the use of such legal power would indicate that
the Minister of Health is acting reasonably from a public international law
perspective. Perhaps this is a novel use of the private international law
doctrine to lawfully support the Minister's claim under public international
law that in certain situations a contractual limitation on the parallel
importing of certain drugs conflicts with public policy. This idea builds on
the notion that there is a residual rule of international law rooted in reason
which mediates between states' claims in making and applying
international law. Therefore, from an international law point of view, the
use of a public policy analogy drawn from private international law is
based on the assumption that the Minister's construction of Section 15(C),
in light of TRIPS, passes a test of interpretive reasonableness as seen from
the perspective of an objective third party appraiser since the public policy
exception is a reasonable exercise of a legal power.
Formulated by Professor H.A. Smith, the standard of reasonable
construction and interpretation of international law reads:
The law of nations, which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any
visible authority universally recognized, professes to be the
application of reason to international conduct. From this it follows
that any claim which is admittedly reasonable may fairly be
presumed to be in accord with law, and the burden of proving that
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW[
it is contrary to the law should lie on the state which opposes the
claim.6 9
It should be noted that the exceptions conferred in Article 30 should not
"unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent. . ." and
"not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner
... 57 Additionally, one must also take into account the legitimate
interests of third parties. Of course, meeting a reasonableness standard
here. would make the Minister's action lawful under TRIPS. In other
words, the Minster of Health must ensure that the protection of health,
security, and safety is reasonable while also considering the relevant,
competing interests.
From an international, constitutional perspective, the reasonable
exercise of such ministerial powers may be viewed as one of the inherent
functions of sovereign competence and international responsibility. The
leading case in international law is the Lotus case (France vs. Turkey).71
69. H.A. SMrnI, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 20 (1950). The rules relating to the
operations of treaties are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31, 32, 1155 U.N.T.S.
33 1. The General Rule of Interpretation stipulates:
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meeting shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Id. art. 31.
70. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 30.
71. S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that
limitations on state sovereignty could not be presumed in international law
in circumstances less critical to public order and safety.7' When given an
interpretive gloss and applied to Section 15(C), the Lotus case holds that
in the absence of clear and unambiguous language in a treaty, the treaty
cannot be construed so as to restrict the state's concern for public order,
security, health, and safety." Therefore, from an international law point of
view, Section 15(C) carries an imprimatur of presumptive reasonableness
unless specific language in a treaty or other concrete source of
international law circumscribes or limits that presumption.
This traditional international law .standard is strengthened when
recourse is had to the U.N. Charter itself. For example, there is an analogy
in the law of self-defense, Article 5 1, that a state has an inherent right to
defend its public order and security.74 Although normally invoked in the
context of armed or potential armed conflicts, via analogy, this provision
can certainly be used to support the reasonableness of a state's claim to
protect its public health and security. Finally, reference may also be made
to Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter which leaves domestic matters, such as
health and security, to be determined by the sovereign state itself unless
explicitly limited by treaty or custom. 75 It is true that TRIPS and related
agreements modify the scope of sovereignty over intellectual property, but
the crucial issue is whether the exceptions which limit central features of
sovereignty can easily be overridden without good justification.
In short, general international law and its standards of construction and
interpretation provide the Minister of Health with strong legal support,
ensuring that action under Section 15(C) complies with international law.
However, this does not address the particular question of whether the
actions of the Minister of Health to specify exact conditions under which
the TRIPS exception might be exercised actually meet the standard of
reasonableness required by international law. It would seem that outside
of instances of national emergencies or extreme urgencies, the non-
commercial use of parallel imports must meet a higher standard of
justification, for in the absence of such reasoning, it would be difficult to
protect the interests of the patent holder. Moreover, such practices could
conceivably be seen as sanctioning unlimited use and unjustifiable taking
of the rights of the patent holder. Indeed, Article 3 1 (c-j) makes it clear that
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
75. Id. art. 2, 7.
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there are standards that must be met to determine what is reasonable and
unreasonable in certain contexts.76
As indicated earlier, in terms of law, what is reasonable must conform
to the constitutional basis of the system which is built on the state's
sovereign equality. 7" But it must also account for other, more general,
standards of international law as critical indicators of what is and what is
not reasonable. For example, there are human rights standards and policies
reflected in both treaty-based law and customary international law that are
clearly implicated in drawing the judicial line between the rights of the
patent holder and the obligation of the Minister of Health to protect the
public health.
For a moment, let us reconsider the situation regarding the AIDS
epidemic in South Africa. This epidemic threatens the right to life. Found
almost universally in every major human rights instrument, the right to life
is a standard human right. It is written in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights78 (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,79 as well as within all regional covenants on human
rights.8" Of course, the state's obligation is not exactly clear in regards to
the protection of life as a positive rather than a negative right. However,
the policy supporting the right to life suggests that the state should do what
it reasonably can to protect the life, health, and security of its citizens.
Sometimes it is hard to specifically pin down what the positive aspect of
the human right to life actually encompasses because global conditions
vary. Nevertheless, what can be said with some confidence, is that when
acting reasonably to protect the right to life as a component of its
responsible sovereign prerogative, the state may be complying with the
general obligation imposed by international law and its own internal law
that it does what it can to secure that right. Accordingly, when the right to
life is so construed, the Minister's construction of the exceptions under
76. TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 31(c-j).
77. See U.N. CRARTER art. 2, 1.
78. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt.
I, Res., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
79. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
80. See generally American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30 - May
2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965) [hereinafter American
Declaration]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter].
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Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS is strengthened. Even if we assume that in the
context of the human right to reasonable health care the right to life must
be seen as an example of international soft law, the right to life is still an
important indicator as to what counts as reasonable or unreasonable
conduct under TRIPS.
South African case law adds another dimension to this inquiry. In
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), the Appellant
demanded access to a dialysis machine in a state hospital."1 The Appellant
argued that without access to the machine he would die. 2 The South
African Constitutional Court determined that the hospital's procedures for
allocating access priorities to the machine were reasonable and found that
Soobramoney did not have an absolute claim, but one of reasonable
access.8 3 Injustifying the juridical quality of the constitutional test, Justice
Chaskalson said,
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth.
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great
poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate
health services. These conditions already existed when the
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and
to transform our society into one in which there will be human
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new
constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to
exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring."
In short, the hospital's allocation of a scarce resource was neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable.
One final indicator of whether a state is acting reasonably in the
protection of public health may be found by using statistics to figure how
much of its GNP a state can rationally afford to allocate towards the
delivery of health care services. This could certainly be a factor in
determining whether a state is acting reasonably in invoking the power to
appropriate compulsory licenses or implement a parallel imports policy.
However, the numbers and statistics in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere
would make such a demonstration unnecessary because AIDS drugs are
81. Soobranoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1998(1) SA 765 (CC) 1.
82. Id.
83. Id. 22-36.
84. Id. 8.
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simply beyond the means of the overwhelming majority of patients, even
when patent holders allow massive price cuts.
B. Obligations Beyond Treaty Law
The use of parallel imports and compulsory licensing in order to
provide access to cost effective medical therapies must be put in the larger
context of the global economic order. From the perspective of the United
States, the abuse of patent, trademark and copyright entitlements affects
the efficiency and fairness of the world's trading market. The experience
of widespread fraud made both manufacturers and technology-exporting
countries sensitive to what is perceived as the theft of intellectual property
(often with state support). But the reaction to countries like India,
Thailand, Brazil, and possibly South Africa, producing and distributing
cheap generic drugs is regarded as more than a simple response (supported
by humane considerations) to a health crisis. Rather, it is seen as a
loophole or slippery slope. In other words, the manufacturers and
technology-exporting countries believe that if AIDS is the bridgehead,
theft-driven invasion forces will soon follow.
C. The Relationship Between South Africa and the United States
The South African-U.S. relationship is a vital case study of conflicting
perspectives. South Africa's efforts to provide some kind of serious,
medical response (apart from public education) for its AIDS victims
required some action and Section 15(C) of the South Africa Medicines Act
was the outcome. In turn, this prompted the global pharmaceutical lobby
to prod the United States into taking a tough stand on the Section 15(C)
bridgehead. The stage was set for a major economic showdown between
a new, vulnerable African state and the world's only superpower. On the
surface, it appeared that Section 15(C) was simply a violation of an
international treaty obligation. South Africa seemed to be technically and
formally wrong, and therefore, it was a potential violator. However, more
careful scrutiny of the U.S. position would reveal that the situation was
less juridical than it was political.
U.S. congressional legislation mandating that the U.S. executive branch
attempt to negotiate a repeal of Section 15(C) illustrated the most
important reaction. In the absence of an appropriate response by the South
African government, the legislation decreed that South Africa effectually
be subject to a form of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, domestic
pressures on the Clinton administration were escalating, and widespread
commentary defended the lawfulness of Section 15(C) under TRIPS. But
ultimately, the Clinton administration retreated on this matter. Although
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the South African government did not rescind the legislation, it arrived at
a garbled, face-saving understanding with the Clinton administration that
eliminated the need for economic sanctions targeted at South Africa.
It should also be understood that a great deal of the conflict was driven
by the power of the pharmaceutical industry. Even U.S. officials later
admitted that while taking into account the problems regarding patent
ownership, hardly any attention was paid to the public health implications
of the U.S. trade policy's support for the pharmaceutical industry."5
Responding belatedly, the pharmaceutical industry has attempted to supply
a reduced form of access to its products on a limited basis. But it remains
unclear whether the scope of the AIDS problem itself renders this
conciliatory move a sufficient basis to remove governmental policies from
the exceptions provided in TRIPS.
One of the issues highlighted by the U.S. effort to suggest that because
TRIPS represents only a minimal standard relating to the respect for patent
rights in international law implies that there is a broader standard of
protection of property rights under international law. This suggests that the
concept of property under U.S. law may be the base for residual property
or ownership rights as understood in the United States.86 A further legal
implication would be that this residual, U.S. property concept would also
have extraterritorial reach, permitting the United States to sanction states
who violate defined property rights, regardless of technical compliance
with TRIPS via parallel imports or compulsory licensing. This represents
a different legal question. The problem is significant as an issue of law
because if it can be resolved by legal means, it may limit the pressures for
political tensions and coercive economic initiatives that undermine the
principle of cooperative sovereignty in international law.
In order for the United States to unilaterally impose sanctions on states
using compulsory licensing or parallel imports outside of TRIPS, the
United States must essentially demonstrate that the property interests in
securing the patent holder's ostensible entitlements are permissible under
general international law. The Lotus case's principle, that in a
decentralized system a state may project its law as far as it can without
infringing upon another state's law, is an important legal concept.
However, when the projection of that state's law clashes with another
state's law, the matter falls within the class of problems known as conflicts
85. Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 52.
86. The implication that property rights are protected by a broader standard of protection
under international law also creates conflicts within the Erie Doctrine and constitutional law.
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ofjurisdiction. 7 Ultimately, the international law standard that the United
States generally adopts is reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
87. The United States addresses conflicts ofjurisdiction via the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason,
which is stated in § 403 of the Restatement:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states
are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant
factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's
interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see also S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see generally CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 134-166 (5th ed. 2001); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 262-267 (1966).
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Law.8 Sections 402 and 403 spell out the bases ofjurisdiction and refer to
the so-called "Jurisdictional Rule of Reason," respectively. 9
The essence of the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason is to determine
whether the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may actually be limited
when its purported use is unreasonable. The first and most important
criticism of the U.S. position is that it may, in effect, be reading its
domestic concept of patent property as if it were a universal datum.
However, the patent statute's definition of property may be theoretically
obsolete.
The nature of patents does not follow the U.S. Restatement's view that
the notion of property is in fact relational. Moreover, the U.S. position
does not acknowledge that the complex web of relationships which
constitutes property in terms ofjural opposites and correlatives is a view
also affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner.90
Considering the kinds of claims to patent rights that infringe on the
cultural patrimony of others, it would stand to reason that a more flexible
conception of property from an international point of view is simply more
appropriate, as indicated in the Bellagio Declaration. 9' The second
objection relates to the human rights and theoretical implications of the
nature of property itself, which is explored in the following section.
IV. THE NATURE OF PROPERTY AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In order to explore the above implications more fully it may be worth
spelling out the sources of property entitlement in U.S. law. There are two
primary sources of intellectual property rights in the United States. The
founding fathers and drafters of the U.S. Constitution appeared to have
understood the value of intellectual property for an emerging, mercantilist
political economy, thus its control and regulation was given a specific
federal imprimatur in Art. I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution: "The
Congress shall have power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 87, at Introduction.
89. Id. at §§ 402, 403.
90. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); cf the Restatement's definition of judicial
jurisdiction: "the phrase 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of
referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 3, topic 2, Title A, § 56 Introductory Note (1971).
91. The Bellagio Declaration from the 1993 Rockefeller Conference "Cultural
Agency/Cultural Authority: Politics and Poetics of Intellectual Property in the Post-Colonial Era,"
Mar. 11, 1993, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/bellagio.htm [hereinafter Bellagio
Declaration].
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."92 This
provision implies a right to property delimited by science and useful arts,
and states that the right is exclusive for limited times. However, it is
unclear what actually was the core, conceptual basis of this right.
Consequently, legislative action was required.
The first U.S. Patent Act was promulgated in 1790, and during the
following 200 years it was rarely amended.93 Today, the U.S. Patent Act
is codified in Title 35 of the U.S. Code Service (35 U.S.C.S. § 101). 94
However, Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act does not provide a clear or
sophisticated conception of the nature of the property interests that require
protection under the statute or the constitutional predicate which
presumably inspired it.95 According to Section 101, "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title. 96
Of course, the critical analyst may wish to know whether there is a
federal concept of property inherently exclusive and distinctive to Article
I, Section 8, and if so, how it is identified and given effect. Clearly, this
may be important, as the concept of property in Article I, Section 8 is one
that is federal and must therefore transcend the particular concepts of
property in the federal union's individual, sovereign states. Furthermore,
to the extent that we can discern a coherent concept of property in the U.S.
Patent Act itself, or in its myriad applications, there may be an issue as to
whether this standard meets the implicit requirement of Article 1, Section
8. More importantly, the key interpretative element of what property might
represent in these instruments must also confront the possible
extraterritorial (international) reach of the property definitions in the U.S.
Patent Act and the U.S. Constitution.
The existence of a cluster of international instruments regulating
international property suggests that the reach of both constitutional and
statutory rules are to be limited by territorial considerations. In other
words, in the absence of an explicit, international agreement giving U.S.
commercial interests property rights on the international plain, there can
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
93. In fact, the U.S. Patent Act has only been amended in 1793, 1836, and 1952. U.S. Patent
Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); U.S. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); U.S.
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
94. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2001).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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be no reliance on the extraterritorial constructions of U.S. law. With this
view, one may conclude that U.S. conceptions of property in Article 1,
Section 8 and the U.S. Patent Act are territorially limited. If the United
States were to predicate intellectual property takings and related
compensatory issues on purely domestic sources of law, it may have to
assume that there is a residual, international law, common concept of
property which includes intellectual property. Moreover, the United States
would have to accept that this further property construct is entitled to
extraterritorial protection from arbitrary or discriminatory takings. Finally,
the United States may also claim that there is a broader, international law,
public interest standard to which it is entitled and that provides a juridical
basis for seeking the protection of its nationals. Insisting on this
international/U.S. concept of the property right combines the property
right with all the benefits and burdens of general international law.
Metaphorically, the property tail would go with the international law hide.
Of greater and more immediate concern are the asserted justifications
for the protection of patent interests as property. From our survey of U.S.
literature, there appears to be two theories that support the concept of
property as a legally protected interest. First, the pragmatic or utilitarian
premise works on the assumption that protection provides an incentive for
future inventive creativity. Thus, the pragmatic or utilitarian form of
property protection rewards initiative as an implicit contract. The second
incentive is based on property as a natural right. As a natural right,
property would presumably be unlimited by territorial restraints. Although
natural law is sometimes seen as unfashionable, the secular version of
natural law is reflected in the fundamental precepts of the U.N. Charter, as
well as in the International Bill of Rights.9" It is from this point of view
that we explore the nature of property.
Juxtaposing the U.S.-centered view with a cross-cultural perspective
on property may be useful. From a cross-cultural, international
perspective, intellectual property law reflects many contrasts and tensions,
although the conflicts are played out in the very technical arena of
draftsmanship, as well as in the interpretation of relevant legal standards.
Perhaps the most concrete expression of these concerns is reflected in the
Bellagio Declaration of 1993.98 According to the drafters of this
Declaration, "Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed
around the notion of the author, the individual, solitary and original
creator, and it is for this figure that its protections are reserved." 99 This
97. International Bill of Rights, supra note 6.
98. Bellagio Declaration, supra note 91.
99. Id.
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specific view represents one particular version of the nature of property,
despite its potential, theoretical problems. Nonetheless, ideologically, it is
strongly promoted by Western, capitalist-oriented democracies on the
basis that private property is one of the surest vehicles toward economic
growth and prosperity.
The Bellagio Declaration also states that there are other ways of
managing interests besides the particular ideological gloss reflected in the
first view. On this topic, the Declaration reads, "Those who do not fit this
model - custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives
practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of
valuable seed varieties, for example - are denied intellectual property
protection."''0 Apart from the general question of cultural patrimony,
which is communitarian in tenor and private in patrimony, there are the
specific issues of how the control of private patrimony might impact
fundamental human rights issues.
A. Theoretical Aspects of Property Relevant to the Interpretation of
Intellectual Property Entitlements in International Law
Generally, the concept of property has been viewed as a construct, or
creature of the sovereign. Thus, lawyers do not only determine whether a
property right exists, but they also seek to discover what the extent of its
reach means for litigants who are required to consult the sources of
national law. This idea was a serviceable notion when political authority
was defined by the imperium exercised over territory and could determine
matters of dominium within the territorial framework. The connection
between imperium and dominium provides juridical architecture meant to
manage a very basic, psycho-sociological fact: in the real world, there are
things of value. Consequently, because human beings often appropriate
things of value, the psycho-social issue, namely, this res is mine and that
res is yours,'' becomes the foundation for one of the most elemental of
human associations, the relationship of human beings with each other
through things. In moving things from the corporeal to the incorporeal, and
from the incorporeal to things styled intellectual property, a legal system
will be seriously challenged to determine exactly what the new forms of
property are, the circumstances under which they are created, and the
extent of the rights thus created. When these forms of property are used in
the vast flow of production and exchange across state, national, and
100. Id.
101. Translated from latin, a res is a thing. More specifically, ares is "an object, interest, or
status, as opposed to a person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1307 (7th ed. 1999).
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sovereign lines, the basic comprehension of why some things are mine and
some things are yours will require greater skills and insights into the
nature of what property is, not from a national perspective, but from a
multinational, multicultural, and even global point of view.
Provoking conflicts between different cultures represented by distinct
sovereignties with diverse property traditions, the problems of property
can emerge in various ways. One significant issue which has a deep impact
upon the idea that certain property forms are exclusively mine and not
yours, illustrates the concept that property is really only property when
ingenuity and intellect combine in its appropriation and exploitation.
Ingenuity in this sense is thought to be an individual attribute, not a
characteristic necessarily shared with others.
On the other hand, there are those who see the notion of the individual
as an ineluctable relationship with others who constitute the community
of the past, present, and future. In this view, the individual's ingenuity is
not wholly atomized and completely distinct from the history and
circumstance of the community that produced and nurtured her. Although
individuals may ingeniously improve upon the intellectual product of the
culture, their own ideas of property (what is mine and what is yours),
indeed, the very perception of property, is that it is a construct in relation
to others and to the political system which constitutes the community.
Sometimes these divergent stances stress the theory that one form of
social organization is individualistic, while the other is communitarian.
But, it is difficult to imagine any society that is not both individualistic and
communitarian. In actuality, individualism and communitarianism are
elements of the framework of social process. Characterized by patterns of
both collaboration and conflict, this framework of social process
determines where to draw the line, when to draw the line, and what
normative standards encased in the phrase "common interest" must guide
the line drawing.
B. Human Rights and the Idea of Property
Like other legal precepts, the concept of intellectual property may, in
Holmesian terms, be labeled the skin of a real living thought. Because
living thoughts are not exactly limited, the connection between living
thoughts, ideas of property, and ownership makes these juridical constructs
incredibly expansive and complex. When mapped onto operating legal
systems, this insight discerns several overlapping, but nonetheless discrete,
conceptions of property and interest. For instance, there is the notion of
property in the common law or civil law system, the theory of property as
affected by constitutional development, the view of property in multi-state
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law, and the perception of property in comparative, international, and for
our purposes, human rights law.
To some extent, these concepts all correspond with the psychological
reality which by law or right holds that this res is mine and that res is
yours. When law intervenes in the process to protect what is yours and
what is mine, the tendency to reify rights and duties relating to things
means that these rights and duties become abstracted from operative
reality. Of course, law wishes to conserve entitlements in the form of
rights, and in doing so it runs into the paradox of intellectual property.
From an observer's perspective, intellectual property stretches as far as the
human, inventive imagination extends. Thus, the logical paradox is that all
is property or all is non-property. More realistically, from a legal
perspective, property is a cluster of complex, conditional, relational
interests which are recognized as differing from one legal culture to
another. Indeed, it is a paradox that the common law idea of ownership
and property is almost disinterested - analytically - in title. But this
common law perception is more practically and theoretically concerned
with both the nuanced expression, and the differentiation of protectable
interests regarding things in their relations with others. Perhaps it is for
this reason that the Restatement adopted an essentially Hohfeldian concept
of property. Hohfeld's scheme of correlatives and opposites of a jural
nature are essentially jural interests. Thus, Charles Donohue, Jr., notes
with blunt realism, "a thing cannot bring or defend a lawsuit.""1 2
Property, in the form of legal interests, begins in the interstices of the
human imagination and is transmitted into a cluster of juridically
recognizable, relational interests by public or social intervention. Thus
intellectual property, as property, is created in the human imagination and
finds juridical expression in the relational context of the social process
itself. In this sense, the term intellectual property, conditions, defines,
mutates, and evolves novel forms of interest which are subsequently
protected as property. Consequently, a reasonable prediction of the future
may be that property, rather than being inherently vested or reified, will in
fact only constrain its forms and interests when human associations cease
themselves. This provides the ultimate constraint on property, intellectual
or otherwise. Putting human capacity at the center of intellectual property
is an indirect means of putting human rights concerns at the heart of the
radiating relationships of interests and public concern generated by the
structure and process of intellectual property itself.
102. Charles Donohue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its Past, in
NOMOS XXII, YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 28,
30 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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C. Human Rights Aspects of Intellectual Property
Intellectual capital is an economic and cultural resource. Property is an
evolving, mutating institution. The interaction in the social process
between resources and institutions is meant, in the best of circumstances,
to facilitate the production and distribution of desired goods and services
(including health care) so that production and distribution (shaping and
sharing) are an optimal social consequence. How successful this process
actually is, is the benchmark of how just, fair, or workable a particular
society is.
Of course, there are many important human rights interests tied to the
issues of property: housing, food, security, water, sanitation, health,
employment, communications, and often life itself. The Special
Rapporteur on The New International Economic Order and the Promotion
of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
in examining the land-resources issue, suggested that land/property reform
was "central to the realization of human rights."'0 3 The Special Rapporteur
also recognized that, "no question is more central to power relations within
society or to issues of equality and income distribution than land."' 4 Many
ideas concerning land (resource) issues have relevance to intellectual
property and human rights development issues. The Special Rapporteur's
assessment of the human rights dimension of land reform builds upon a
wide variety of international instruments dealing with the topic. For
example, in the U.N. Declaration on Social Progress and Development,
Article 17(d) indicates the importance of appropriate supervision for the
"utilization of land in the interests of society."' ' Article 18(b) suggests
that a democratic society includes a commitment to land reform to achieve
the objectives of "social justice and economic development.""'°
Substituting intellectual property for the terms land and property echoes
the same policy conclusions concerning the relationship of material and
intellectual resources to human rights and development.
The concept of a right to property, from a constitutional and even a
customary international law perspective, often avoids defining the nature
103. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the New International Economic Order and the
Promotion of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ESCOR, U.N.
C.H.R., 42d Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 121, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/19 (1990) [hereinafter
Report of the Special Rapporteur].
104. Id.
105. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR,
24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at art. 17(d), U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
106. Id. art. 18(b).
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of property. These areas of law implicitly assume there is a relevant thing
in law called a "res," or property. In human rights law, the interpretative
gloss on the notion of property does not endorse the idea that one has a
right to, rather it is that one should not be arbitrarily deprived of the right.
Therefore, the meaning of property is in part contingent upon the rules of
natural justice, what forms of national and international processes are due,
whether rights are relationally determined by unfair discriminations, and
whether other basic freedoms or human rights are actually implicated in
the right to property notion.
The relational nature of human interests in valued things has often been
seen as implicating a major divide between systems of social organization
based on individualistic precepts and those based on shared or collectivist
precepts. In short, at the fundamental level, there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the individual and the community - a dualist outlook
deeply ingrained in Western ideas of moral and legal order. In
international law, this dualism expresses itself in the degree to which
foreign economic rights or entitlements are protected by law, and in
whether permanent sovereignty over matters of vital socio-political
salience in the public interest are also to be secured. Moreover, the
profound international impact of intellectual property claims and
entitlements has in turn given added importance and complexity to this
classical problem.'07
The various human rights instruments provide further normative
guidance, although the definition and scope of the concept of property and
entitlements is disputed to some degree. The UDHR refers specifically to
property. Article 17 holds that, "Everyone has the right to own property.
• .,, 08 and that, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."' 9 In
contrast, the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms does not use the word property in terms reflective
of the UDHR's Article 17. Indeed, it does not specify a right to acquire
property at all. But, it is worth quoting the relevant part of this provision:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest ... The preceding provisions shall not,
107. As demonstrated by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass 'n v. President of the Republic
of South Africa, the WTO complaint the United States launched against Brazil's compulsory
licensing of AIDS drugs patents, and the successful campaign of developing countries to expand
the compulsory licensing conditions of TRIPs at the WTO meeting in Doha, Qatar.
108. UDHR, supra note 78, art. 17(l).
109. Id. art. 17(2).
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however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest .... ."0
The provision does not add up to a human right to ownership. Rather, it
assumes possessory rights."'
Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights holds that
everyone has the "right to the use and enjoyment of his property," but that
this interest may be subordinated in the common interest:1 2 it also
indicates that the dispossession of property entitles the person deprived to
have "just compensation."' " The American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man anticipates the relationship of property to second generation
human rights. Article XXIII states that: "Every person has a right to own
such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.""' 4 The
Special Rapporteur on the New International Economic Order and the
Promotion of Human Rights concludes that Article XXIII, more than any
other human rights-property provision, "approaches the issue of property
from the perspective of a necessary entitlement to fulfil the needs of
decent living and dignity.""' 5
Let us return briefly to the UDHR. Article 17 of the UDHR is both
controversial and ambiguous." 6 Must this Article's prescription be read in
conjunction with the other UDHR provisions, including the economic,
social and cultural entitlements, as well as the developing human right to
development? Or must it be read disjunctively, in isolation, standing alone
without the interpretive guidance of the UDHR's other provisions? And
what, in any event, is property for the purpose of the UDHR or human
rights in general?
If the right to property is read disjunctively, standing apart from the
UDHR's other provisions, the following consequence might occur.
Because property has a close affinity with effective power, and is by itself
an important base of power, an unqualified right to property could
disparage the other rights in the UDHR. Consequently, we are left with the
110. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, May 18, 1954, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (emphasis added).
111. Possessory rights consist of a property interest conditioned by regulation in the public
interest.
112. American Convention, supra note 80, art. 2 1(1).
113. Id. art. 21(2).
114. American Declaration, supra note 80, art. XXIII.
115. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 103, at 132.
116. See UDHR, supra note 78, art. 17.
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unenviable task of holding that the definition of property in Article 17
must be read in light of all the other provisions in the UDHR. In other
words, the meaning of the right to property cannot be read disjunctively;
it must be derived from the relevant context - the communal environment
within which all the other enumerated rights function. The scope of the
right will then be a variable one, subject to interpretative standards and
intellectual dexterity, but it will be guided by the overriding goal values
implicit in the concept of human dignity.
Relating to the human right to property, the trend in prescription has
retreated from the bland literalism that might be used to construe this
provision. The European Convention focuses on possessory interests in
property. 1 7 In contrast, the American Convention focuses on use and
enjoyment interests in property."' The American Declaration, which is the
instrument most consistent with the evolving understanding of the so-
called human right to property, constrains the human rights property
interest to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, or in
contemporary terms, a right to development at least in terms of basic needs
or interest." 9 But the deeper meaning of property in this context is that it
must be construed relationally, specifically in connection to other human
rights values. Relationally and contextually, the general property right in
human rights law does not entrench a right to property independent of
other human rights standards. Furthermore, the scope of this right is highly
challenged in international human rights law. However, its relational and
contextual limits provide powerful normative guidance to interpretations
of the reach of TRIPS provisions, as well as to understandings of the
state's scope of reasonable prescription to either extra-territorially secure
its property interests or protect its health, security and related human rights
concerns.
V. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
The question of whether Section 15(C) and its related provisions might
find international support requires a reasonable exercise of the prescriptive
competence of the Republic of South Africa. From an international
perspective, South Africa must not only explore the scope of human rights
on the right to property under general international law, it must also
determine whether the right to health, as found in the International Bill of
Rights and other international instruments, supports the principle that the
117. See generally European Convention, supra note 80.
118. American Convention, supra note 80, art. 21.
119. American Declaration, supra note 80, art. XXIII.
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delegation of power to the Minister of Health allows her to protect the
public's health by making necessary medicines affordable and available.
The international literature on the right to health or health care is vast
and unsettled. According to Van Boven, health care in human rights terms
means, (i) a declaration that the right to health is a basic human right; (ii)
that there is an expectation that there will be a prescription of standards
aimed at meeting the health needs of specific groups; and (iii) that there is
the application of a prescription as the vehicle for concrete
implementation. 0 But this may be too simplistic and avoids giving a more
coherent definition of the scope of the right or the nature of the obligations
the human right to health care entails. In Ruth Roemer's study, The Right
to Health Care, there is the suggestion that health care itself is
relational.' Thus the right to health care is said to include "protective
environmental services, prevention and health promotion, [and]
therapeutic services . . ." as well as "related actions in sanitation,
environmental engineering, housing,... and social welfare... .,'
In different terms, when health care is an objective demand that is
sought, it depends on other basic values to secure its realization. These
values may include power, wealth, skill, enlightenment, solidarity and
caring, commitment to respect, and a system of moral or spiritual rectitude
that appreciates dignity. But regardless of these values, health care is a
codified human right, as illustrated in Article 25 of the UDHR: "Everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
... sickness [and] disability."'
Because the right here is tied to social policy, it is often thought that
this is not a right at all, but a policy objective. Hence, it has no trumping
power, as would be inherent in a real right. However, this provision can be
used tojustify the reasonableness of national legislation and administrative
action seeking to give the right juridical effect. The Preamble of the WHO
Constitution contains stronger language and at least implicit normative
guidance for its application. The relevant part reads as follows: "The
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
120. Theo Van Boven, Lecture at the U.N. Workshop on "The Right to Health" (1979).
121. See Ruth Roemer, The Right to Health Care, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS
17 (Hernan Fuenzalida-Puelma & Susan Scholle Connor eds., 1989).
122. Id.
123. UDHR, supra note 78, art. 25(1).
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fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition."' 24
Mentioning the "highest attainable standard," the WHO Preamble
implies that the attainable is what can be reasonably secured. Moreover,
this is qualified by the notion that the right is fundamental. The highest, or
best, attainable standard is also indicated in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12(1);125 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Article 24(1);126 and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 16.127 Additional references are found
in the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Article 5(e); 128 the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 12(1);29 and the
American Declaration of the Rights of Duties of Man, Article XI' 30
Furthermore, as earlier indicated, in Soobramoney, the President of the
South African Constitutional Court held that there was a juridically
enforceable right to health care under the new South African Constitution,
but that in the reasonable allocation of scarce medical resources, the right
would be correspondingly delimited."'3 This case also supports the highest
(reasonably) ascertainable standard of the WHO's Preamble as well.
The South African Constitution also legitimizes a right to health care.
Section 27(3) of the 1996 South African Constitution provides that, "No
one may be refused emergency medical treatment.' ' 132 Section 11, which
has extremely significant implications for the nation's health policy holds
that, "Everyone has the right to life."'133 A major purpose of the new
constitutional dispensation in South Africa was to establish a society based
on democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human rights.
Section 27(2) holds that the state jurists take reasonable legislative and
non-legislative measures for the progressive realizing of, inter alia, the
124. WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl.
125. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
12(l), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
126. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 24(1), G.A. Res. 44/25
(Annex), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/49 (1990).
127. African Charter, supra note 80, art. 16.
128. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(e), 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
129. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, art. 12(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
130. See American Declaration, supra note 80, art. X1.
131. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1998(1) SA 765 (CC) 22-36.
132. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 19, at ch. 11, § 27(3).
133. Id. atch. 11,§ 11.
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right to "health care."' 34 Specifically, Section 27(1)(a) implements a right
of access to health care services. 3 '
VI. CONCLUSION
General international law, including human rights law, provides a
standard by which problems falling outside the lex specialis regime of
intellectual property treaty law may be judged. Interpretive questions
involving normative ambiguity may be answered by recourse to general
principles of international law, including human rights law. But the
implications of international law are broader. They force us to elementally
reexamine our fundamental institutions, such as property, and how those
might be construed to complement, rather than undermine, the primary
goals of world order.
Intellectual property entitlements cannot be insulated from the larger
discourse about the nature of property itself. A central feature of the
epistemology of property is that it presupposes a social context that in turn
implies a complex web of relational interests. These interests and
relational ties operate in the local and global dimensions of law and the
social process. Consequently, the meaning of property is in part context-
dependent. What the human rights focus provides is a window into just
how far-reaching and challenging this web of relational interests actually
is. A similar complexity attends the accepted datum that human rights are
in fact complicated, interdetermining, and interdependent processes.
The reality of human rights is defined by social interaction which
encompasses complex webs of relationships. At a normative level of
analysis, there is an insistence in the interpretation of human rights
instruments as comprehensive and indivisible. The right to life and the
right to health care certainly present such a challenge. However, what is
clear is that the interpretation of the relevant international standards in the
lex specialis (the treaty-based regime) does not, by any means, exhaust the
scope of defining international obligations in international intellectual
property law. If it did, the state of world order would be in poorer shape
than it currently is.
134. Id. at ch. II, § 27(2).
135. Id. atch. II, § 27(I)(a).

